EU Project “Chat Control”: Official Goal and Actual Intent – An Attempt at Analysis
“The welfare of the people has always been the alibi of tyrants, and it provides the additional advantage of giving tyranny’s servants a good conscience.” (Albert Camus, L’Homme révolté, 1951)
- What is this issue truly about?
The Official Purpose (Official Rhetoric)
The European Commission and proponents of the regulation on “Chat Control,” or officially the Regulation on preventing and combating child sexual abuse (CSAR/CSAM), present this as a necessary measure to protect children from sexual abuse and prevent the dissemination of Child Sexual Abuse Material (CSAM) online.
They argue that it is essential to create a long-term legal framework to replace the current voluntary and fragmented arrangements and to prevent criminals from using encrypted messages to spread abuse.
Nonsense.
The Real, Actual Purpose and Goal (Critical Analysis)
Critics, including digital rights organisations, cryptographers, and some politicians, as well as legal professionals, warn that the fight against CSAM is merely a “noble excuse” or “alibi of tyrants” (as stated by Albert Camus), serving as a leveraging tool for introducing mass surveillance over the entire EU population.
The actual goals, evident from the mechanisms of the proposed regulation, are as follows:
First, the establishment of a totalitarian surveillance infrastructure. The proposal demands the mandatory scanning of all private communications (text, photos, videos, cloud files – yes, even in the “cloud”), and this must be done in real-time, before the data is encrypted (the so-called client-side scanning).
Furthermore, this involves the introduction of a dangerous legal precedent. Namely, if the state can demand access to private conversations and even the destruction of encryption for one purpose (CSAM), this precedent can quickly expand to surveillance of political expression, not only terrorism, but of course – and this is particularly important and destructive – officially, systemically labelled “disinformation” (which translates to “censorship or prohibition and punishment of any revelation or questioning of official mainstream claims – as lies and deceptions – censorship of the truth”). Not just economic crime. This significantly increases the power of the state over the individual.
Additionally, the abolition of anonymity and digital privacy. The regulation would effectively end secure End-to-End Encryption (E2EE) communication, which is vital for the protection of democracy, journalistic sources, trade secrets, and of course – private life, privacy.
2. Constitutional and Legal Acceptability
Based on existing legal standards, established through decades of the rule of law and constitutional democracy, and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), the proposed regulation in its current form is constitutionally and legally unacceptable.
Specific Legal Arguments “Against”
Violation of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
Article 7 (Right to respect for private and family life): The proposal represents a disproportionate intrusion into privacy, as surveillance is not limited to ‘suspected persons’ (much less migrants), but includes discriminatory mass surveillance of all citizens.
Article 8 (Right to protection of personal data). Mass and indiscriminate scanning of content data contradicts the consistent and established case law of the CJEU, which systematically rejects the general and non-selective retention or processing of communications data, as this undermines the very core of the right to privacy.
Destruction of End-to-End Encryption (E2EE). The regulation requires scanning messages on the user’s device (!!) (client-side scanning), even before the message is encrypted. Experts emphasise that this method inherently undermines E2EE protection by creating a backdoor that could be vulnerable to cybercriminals, foreign intelligence services, and abuse by authoritarian regimes.
Incompatibility with the Rule of Law. The measure would create a system where private service providers (IT companies) would act as automated, de facto police organs, with software (AI) performing surveillance that should otherwise be under strict judicial oversight and directed solely at targeted individuals (based on reasonable suspicion).
3. Certain and Potential Consequences
| Category | Certain Consequences (if the regulation is adopted) | Potential/Long-Term Consequences |
| Rights and Freedom | The end of private and secure digital communication in the EU. | “Chilling Effect”: Users will self-censor their expression, which will jeopardise freedom of expression, especially for journalists, whistleblowers, activists, and the opposition. |
| Security and Technology | Introduction of a critical security vulnerability (backdoor) that can be exploited by criminals and foreign intelligence services, thus weakening the overall digital security of the EU. | Gradual expansion of surveillance to other content (terrorism, systemically-officially designated “political extremism,” “hate speech”), blurring the line between combating crime and mere political control. |
| Feasibility and Effectiveness | A flood of false positives. Experts warn that algorithms make mistakes (some sources mention up to 80% incorrect reports), which will overload police and judicial authorities and lead to false accusations and investigations of innocent citizens (e.g., when scanning family or medical photos). | Actual criminals will easily evade surveillance by using simple technical changes or less-known, encrypted services, making the regulation ineffective in achieving its official goal. |
(Table generated by AI)
It is evidently, plainly obvious that this measure has virtually no connection with its officially stated objective.
It is about everything else, just not the officially asserted purpose. There is no room for doubt about this.
4. Is This Happening, in Part or in Whole, Today?
It can be reasonably claimed that this is partially happening already, but on a different legal basis.
And that is all, so to speak.
Currently, a temporary derogation from the e-Privacy Directive is used in the EU, which allows online service providers to voluntarily scan messages for the detection of CSAM.
This voluntary practice is already occurring on platforms like Messenger and WhatsApp (with unencrypted data, or before encryption where it is possible, and especially with cloud storage – “cloud”).
Fundamental Difference: Before vs. After
Today legally, a “temporary exception” applies: scanning is voluntary for providers.
The “Chat Control” Regulation will cause scanning to become mandatory for all providers and will legally require the establishment of mechanisms that destroy E2EE (client-side scanning), raising surveillance to a completely new, total level.
5. Assessment of the Regulation’s Further Development (Status End of 2025)
The development of the regulation has entered a critical, yet extremely complex phase. It is causing a rupture in the EU Council.
After a prolonged stalemate, the Council of the EU (Ministers of Member States) reached a common position at the end of November 2025.
The provision on mandatory indiscriminate scanning of messages was formally removed from the proposal, acceding to pressure from countries such as Germany.
The “Trojan Horse” in this matter is voluntariness. Despite the potential final removal of mandatory scanning, critics warn that a “Trojan Horse” was adopted.
The Council’s position legalises and permanently extends voluntary scanning as a risk reduction measure.
Platforms wishing to reduce their legal liability will thus be de facto encouraged to maintain indiscriminate scanning of all communications.
This is a paradoxical irony: non-discrimination, equal application for all, leads to totality, totality to totalitarianism.
Discrimination, positive discrimination, would mean this process would only be carried out in precisely defined cases, for a precisely defined purpose, and would target precisely defined individuals.
No, it targets the entire public, the entire population, every individual, generally.
In the sense of “fishing expeditions”: everything should be monitored, everything should be recorded, and whatever is found will be used as it will be used.
New intrusions into the private sphere are being introduced. New controversial elements have been added, including mandatory age verification for so-called high-risk services (which critics believe effectively destroys anonymity) and the extension of scanning to text analysis (grooming) using AI, which, given the lack of AI precision, carries a high risk of false positives and political abuses.
It is evident that “checking everyone” is not intended to exclude specific groups, but literally what it is intended for—checking everyone.
6. The Future (Trilogue)?
The proposal has now entered trilogue negotiations between the EU Commission, the Council of the EU, and the (toothless nodding) European Parliament.
Since the Parliament was considerably more critical of mass surveillance in its position, the future of the regulation is theoretically uncertain.
But not really. The final solution will be a superficial compromise between formally protecting encryption and de facto enabling broad “voluntary” scanning.
Due to the expiry of the temporary regulation in April 2026, the pressure to adopt the final text will be extremely strong.
One should not be fooled into thinking that the European Parliament would be any serious obstacle in this.
7. Addendum: Assessment of “Chat Control” in the Context of Total Digital Control (Anti-Mainstream View)
The planned “Chat Control” regulation (CSAM) can be viewed in connection with other initiatives, such as the European Digital Identity (eIDAS 2.0) and the potential introduction of Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC).
Critics treat this not as an isolated legislative act, but as a crucial, integral part of a global infrastructure for complete digital surveillance over the individual.
Analysis of the Connection and the Actual Goal
The anti-mainstream analysis emphasises that the official goal (child protection) is merely an emotional alibi and a manoeuvre to introduce technology that is otherwise constitutionally prohibited.
By forcing tech companies to implement Client-Side Scanning, two key precedents are created:
Technological Precedent. A legally standardised and legalised mechanism for accessing content before it is encrypted. Once this mechanism is established, it can easily be extended to identify other content treated as “harmful content”: e.g., “disinformation,” “political extremism,” financial transactions. It is clear to the informed and understanding that the first two are a systemic, ideological, and official valve for exposing untruths, deceptions, manipulations…
Legal Precedent. The state can determine that a certain right (in this case, privacy and encryption) is void in the name of a “higher good” (which is labelled as “security”). This opens the door to further erosion of fundamental rights.
The End of Anonymity and the Link to “Digital ID”
The most significant link to total control is the inclusion of mandatory Age Verification in the “Chat Control” proposal for services considered “high-risk.”
Destruction of Anonymity. Age verification requires the individual to permanently link their digital activity (chat, post) with their legal identity. This effectively destroys the possibility of anonymous online communication and political expression, which is the foundation of a free society.
Establishment of Digital ID Infrastructure. Critics argue that the Digital ID (which is expected to become mandatory with the broader eIDAS 2.0 legislation) is a “tool for inclusion in and exclusion from the system”. Through mandatory age verification, “Chat Control” compels platforms to embed the mechanisms necessary for the operation of a universal Digital ID.
The Concept of Holistic Control (Social Credit System)
According to this critical assessment, the true goal of these interconnected measures is the establishment of complete technocratic control, comparable to a digital social credit system.
| Component | Established by | Controls |
| Identity | Digital ID (eIDAS 2.0), Age Verification (Chat Control) | Who you are (no anonymity) |
| Communication | Chat Control (AI scanning) | What you think and say |
| Financing | CBDC (Central Bank Digital Currency) | What you buy and spend |
(Table generated by AI)
With this infrastructure, the state or supranational institutions and their organs could, in real-time, combine data on identity, expression (if AI detects a “harmful thought”), and finances.
This enables the exclusion of individuals from digital services, the financial system, or social rights based on unacceptable (or inappropriate) behaviour or expression.
The measure, process, and goal are transparently obvious. Welcome to the totalitarianism of Big Brother and the absolute control of everyone, always and everywhere.
7. Conclusion
“Chat Control” is not a law to combat crime! It is a strategic operation that, under the guise of security, creates the technical and legal conditions for a transition to digital totalitarianism, where anonymity is abolished, privacy is ended, and the individual is entirely subordinate to algorithmic and bureaucratic control.
Mic drop.
List of Main Sources and References:
Legal and Civil Society Criticism
- Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF): EU’s ‘Chat Control’ Regulation and the Death of Privacy. San Francisco, USA, 2024. (Analysis of technical risks and Client-Side Scanning.)
- Gesellschaft für Freiheitsrechte e.V. (GFF): Die GFF zur Chatkontrolle. | Berlin, Germany, 2024.
- Information Commissioner of the Republic of Slovenia (IP). Position: IP: ‘Chat Control’ must not become an excuse for mass surveillance of communications. Ljubljana, 2022.
- European Digital Rights (EDRi): Chat Control: What is actually going on? Brussels, Belgium, 2025.
- European Digital Rights (EDRi): Chat Control, Age Verification, and the Plan to End Anonymous Communication. Brussels, Belgium, 2024. (Note: Analysis emphasizing that age verification serves as a key entry mechanism for mandatory digital identification and surveillance.)
Technical and Expert Criticism
- Group of more than 500 Cryptographers and Experts: Open Letter from over 500 Cryptographers and Security Experts. Global, 2023. (Open Letter.)
- Schneier, Bruce: Why the EU’s Chat Control Proposal Is a Bad Idea. Blog/Media Publication, 2023.
- Signal (Blog): For a future with privacy, not mass surveillance, Germany must stand firmly against client-side scanning in the Chat Control proposal. USA/Global, 2025. (Note: Strong statement from the Signal company, warning about the impact of Chat Control on fundamental digital freedom.)
- Max-Planck-Gesellschaft. Troncoso, Carmela: “More monitoring, but not more protection.” Germany, 2025. (Note: Analysis warning of the misuse of AI for “grooming” analysis and the shortcomings of the proposed measures that undermine privacy.)
Political and Media Criticism
- Bojan Petelin: Protection of Children from Abuse as an Excuse for Complete Control of Europeans. | Dnevnik. Ljubljana, 2024. (Note: Journalistic analysis, which critically addresses non-mainstream arguments.)
- Prebilič, Vladimir (MEP, Greens/EFA Group): “Protection of Children as an Alibi for Mass Surveillance”. (Press Release). Brussels/Ljubljana, 2024.
- Patrick Breyer (MEP): Reality Check: EU Council Chat Control Vote is Not a Retreat, But a Green Light for Indiscriminate Mass Surveillance and the End of Right to Communicate Anonymously. Brussels, Belgium, 2025. (Note: Critical assessment explicitly linking mandatory age verification to the Digital ID agenda and the end of anonymity.)
- Euractiv. Moreau, Claudie: EU countries reach breakthrough on chat-scanning law despite intense pushback. Brussels, Belgium, 2025.
- Engadget. Bonk, Lawrence: EU backs away from requiring tech companies to scan and remove CSAM. Global, 2025.
Legal Basis and EU Case Law
- Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union: Articles 7 and 8 (Right to respect for private and family life and protection of personal data).
- Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU): Judgments on non-discriminatory data retention (e.g., cases Tele2 Sverige C-203/15; La Quadrature du Net C-511/18). (Note: judicial standard that prohibits the general and non-selective processing of communications data.)
Sources on Total Digital Control / Anti-Mainstream View
- Technocracy News & Trends / Wood, Patrick: Chat Control Is Part Of The Great Reset, Digital ID, CBDC Totalitarian Nexus. Global, 2024. (Note: Highly anti-mainstream analysis linking Chat Control, Digital ID, CBDC, and the “Great Reset” agenda into a holistic technocratic surveillance plan.)
- Slovenian activist and critical portals (e.g., Association for Freedom of Speech): Digital ID as the Key to a Society of Complete Control. Ljubljana, 2024. (Note: Analysis on the establishment of the Digital ID infrastructure in connection with EU laws, including eIDAS 2.0.)
- Insajder. https://www.translateen.com/us-date-format/write-the-correct-date-format-27-november-in-american-english-words/ (November 27, 2025)